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Globalization of Law Firms:
A Survey of the Literature and a
Research Agenda for Further Study
D. DANIEL SOKOL*
ABSTRACT
The international expansion of law firms plays a critical role in understanding the
business of law and the nature of globalization. This article responds to the articles by
Carole Silver and Len Bierman and Michael Hitt on law firm expansion in this sym-
posium issue on the Globalization of the Legal Profession. The essay utilizes manage-
ment studies' theoretical work on internationalization and applies it to law firm
expansion to explain law firm strategic decision-making. The author creates a six-
part taxonomy for types of law firm expansion and provides a snapshot of the increas-
ing U.S./UK. dominance of capital markets, corporate and mergers & acquisitions
legal work around the world. Finally, the article proposes an interdisciplinary research
agenda that incorporates law, economics, sociology, economic geography, and man-
agement studies to more fully understand law firm expansion.
INTRODUCTION
The international expansion of law firms, which began in earnest in the
1980s, has transformed large law firms.' Law firm expansion plays a critical role
in understanding the business of law and the nature of globalization. Law firms
*William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. This article focuses on the expansion of large law firms for the reason that the practice of law
is qualitatively different in large law firms than in other law firms. See John Flood, The Growth of
Large Law Firms and Its Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education: Megalaw in the UK.:
Professionalism or Corporatism?A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 569, 570 (1989); Marc Galanter,
Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in THE SocIoLoGY OF THE PRO-
FESSIONs: LAWYERS, DOCTORS, AND OTHERS 152, 153-55 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds.,
1983).
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also provide a case study of how one industry within the professional services sec-
tor addresses global expansion. This case study may shed light more generally on
how professional service firms respond to an increasingly global marketplace and
the various strategies that such firms may use to meet these challenges.
This article begins the process of closing the gap in the existing literature on law
firm expansion. It does so by utilizing management studies' theoretical work on in-
ternationalization and applying it to law firm expansion to explain law firm strategic
decision-making. This article creates a six-part taxonomy for types of law firm ex-
pansion. It also provides a snapshot of the increasing U.S./U.K. dominance of capital
markets, corporate and mergers and acquisitions legal work around the world.
Moreover, this article responds to the articles by Carole Silver and Len Bierman and
Michael Hitt on law firm expansion in this symposium issue on the Globalization of
the Legal Profession. Finally, this article proposes a robust interdisciplinary research
agenda that incorporates law, economics, sociology, economic geography, and man-
agement studies to more fully understand law firm expansion.
I. THE BLACK Box OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM EXPANSION
A. The Tournament Model
Global expansion of law firms must be understood within the larger context of
the growth of the law firm as a business organization. Law firms do not have out-
side investors. Rather, the employees are also the owners of the firm.2 Previous schol-
arship has developed a framework to understand law firm expansion. Galanter and
Palay's seminal book, Tournament of Lawyers, argues that law firms operate within
an up-or-out pyramid structure.3 As an associate makes partner, to maintain firm
leverage, the firm requires an additional number of associates. The purpose of the
tournament is to create greater leverage for the firm's human capital and to prevent
shirking by lawyers within the firm. In the tournament model, the most important
factor in the transformation of law firms is size expansion of firms in terms of total
number of lawyers. Other empirical work supports the tournament explanation.4
2. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 67 (1996). More accurately, a subset of
employees (equity partners) own the firm.
3. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BIG LAW FIRM 99-102 (1991).
4. John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson & Edward 0. Laumann, The Scale ofJustice: Observations
on the Transformation of Urban Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. Soc. 337, 338 (2001). The tournament
theory has been further expanded upon by David Wilkins and Mitu Gulati, who add a number of
GLOBALIZATION OF LAW FIRMS
Recent empirical work provides additional explanation of law firm expansion
and the tournament model. Using data from Martindale-Hubbell for U.S.-based
law firms from the period 1998-2005, Baker and Parkin find that large U.S. law
firms have grown over time. This growth has come about with an increase in the
number of offices for firms. Increased leverage has accompanied the expansion in
the size and geographic scope of large law firms. Similarly, an increasing number
of attorneys have fallen from the two-tiered partnership track and have taken on
non-partner designations at these firms.'
Another recent contribution to the literature is the work of William Hender-
son. Henderson's findings suggest that the tournament model has changed in that
there are now at least two stages to the tournament in most large U.S. law firms.
The first stage is to move from the ranks of an associate to that of partner. The
second stage of the tournament occurs at the partner level in which non-equity
(service) partners battle to join the ranks of equity partners. Henderson has stud-
ied the domestic effects of partnership tracks at American Lawyer ("Am Law")
200 large law firms. His findings explain why all but a small number of law firms
have abandoned the single-tier partnership model for a two-tiered approach be-
tween equity and non-equity partners. The firms that remain single tier are those
with fewer offices and higher levels of prestige. These findings support a conclu-
sion that the tier structure of a firm is a function of a firm's relative standing in its
ability to gain high-end corporate work.6
The works of Baker and Parkin and Henderson have not been extended to
the study of international offices of U.S. law firms. It may be that the type of part-
nership structure varies across countries. Overhead costs may be different, the
caveats to this tournament. They posit that (1) many within the associate ranks may not seek to
participate in the tournament; (2) partners favor some associates over others in the tournament
based on the type of assignments that they give; (3) firm interests and the interests of individual
partners may not be aligned; (4) the tournament has more than two stages; (5) becoming a partner
is not caused by past performance as an associate; and (6) the tournament process lacks transpar-
ency. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seed-
ing, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581,
1586-87 (1998). Though some scholars have shown limits to the tournament model, no alternative
explanatory device seems to have emerged to overtake it as the basis for understanding law firm
growth. See, e.g., Heinz, Nelson & Laumann, supra, at 344-46; Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass
Williams, A Little Theorizing About the Big Law Firm: Galanter, Palay, and the Economics of
Growth, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 391 (1992).
5. George P. Baker & Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and
the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1635, 1677-78 (2006).
6. William D. Henderson,An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the
Am Law 200,84 N.C. L. REv. 1691, 1748-1750 (2006).
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prestige element may differ between local and international firms, and the amount
that a firm may be willing to pay for international human capital may be different
across markets. These and many other questions about the globalization of U.S.
and foreign law firms remain unanswered. It is with these and other research
questions in mind that we must approach the study of the growth in internation-
alization of law firms.
B. New Insights
Much remains unknown about the mechanisms and dynamics of interna-
tional law firm expansion. Two works from the 14 h Annual Conference of the
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, "Globalization of the Legal Profession,"
provide important insights into international expansion of law firms: Carole Sil-
ver's "Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms"' and Len
Bierman and Michael Hitt's "The Globalization of Legal Practice in the Internet
Age."8 In her article, Silver has added an important work to her extensive research
agenda into the globalization of law firms and the legal practice.9 Silver's current
article expresses the tension and the transition of law firms as they act globally on
both international and local matters.
Silver identifies an important trend among U.S.-based law firms. Firms that
have expanded internationally nearly always have a major New York presence."
This suggests the importance of New York corporate law and that corporate in-
ternational expansion seems to be the driver of international expansion. The na-
ture of this corporate law-based global expansion remains somewhat of a mystery.
7. Carole Silver, Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 67 (2007).
8. Leonard Bierman & Michael A. Hitt, The Globalization of Legal Practice in the Internet Age,
14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Carole Silver, Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services: Situating the
Market for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 897 (2005); Carole Silver, Internationalizing U.S.
Legal Education: A Report on the Education of Transnational Lawyers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 143 (2006); Carole Silver, Regulating International Lawyers: The Legal Consultant Rules, 27
Hous. J. INT'L L. 527 (2005); Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the International Market for
Legal Services, 23 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 487 (2003) [hereinafter Silver, Regulatory Mismatch]; Bryant
G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 903 (2002); Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the US. Legal
Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039 (2002).
10. Silver, supra note 7, at 72.
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Lawyers in large firms specialize in specific practice areas of law." When there is
international expansion, do we find specialization in smaller satellite offices along
practice area specializations? Can particular country markets handle such precise
levels of specialization based on the cost of legal services by foreign firms? While
U.S. firms traditionally have expanded into corporate practices abroad, Silver sug-
gests that there is an increasing litigation and regulatory aspect to foreign expan-
sion. 2 Silver examines the number of U.S. law firms with foreign offices. This is
an important first step. However, questions remain as to how to account for the
scale, scope, quality, and success of these offices. 3
Silver's article focuses on the U.S. aspect of globalization. However, the glo-
balization of law firms has increasingly significant London- and New York-based
components. Chambers & Partners publishes a yearly guide of the best law firms
in the various jurisdictions around the world.4 I use their 2006 Chambers Global
Guide as a source for data to illustrate the increasing supremacy of U.S.-based
and London-based law firms in international capital markets and corporate/
merger and acquisition deals in the capital markets of China/Hong Kong, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States."
11. See Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Firms' Boundaries and the Division of Labor:
Empirical Strategies, I EuRo. ECON. Assoc. 495 (2003).
12. Silver, supra note 7.
13. Economic geographers suggest that most U.S. law firms with international offices have only
a small international footprint. See J.V. Beaverstock, R.G. Smith & P.J. Taylor, Geographies of Glo-
balization: United States Law Firms in World Cities, 21 URB. GEOGRAPHY 95, 115 (2000). Similar
work has begun to explain the internationalization of London based law firms. See generally J.V.
Beaverstock, P.J. Taylor & R.G. Smith, The Long Arm of the Law: London's Law Firms in a Global-
ising World Economy, 31 ENV'T& PLANNING 1857 (1999).
14. Chambers' description of its methodology is as follows: "[rlesearch into the strengths and
reputations of lawyers in the Global Guide is carried out in the same way as the research for the
Chambers 'UK' and 'USA' guides. The methodology has been approved by the British Market
Research Bureau, which audits the research annually. In-depth interviews with clients and law-
yers are done over the telephone, each one lasting about half an hour .... For the current Global
directory, over 6,500 of these interviews were conducted covering 170 countries. They were carried
out by a team of 30 full-time researchers over a period of 12 months." Chambers and Partners,
Global Guide, Research & Rankings Explained, http://www.chambersandpartners.com/global/
research-ranking.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). Chambers is in many ways the equivalent to law
school rankings for the U.S. News & World Report. Firms monitor their Chambers rankings very
carefully. Chambers has its flaws-it measures perceptions of the strength of firms and practitio-
ners rather than the actual strength of such people and firms. However, based on the difficulty of
more direct measurements, Chambers is the least bad current methodology to measure practice
group and individual quality of lawyers and firms.
15. See Chambers and Partners, Search Global Guide, http://www.chambersandpartners.com/
global/search.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
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Chart I: Ratio of Local Firms to All Top Firms
Practice China France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Corporate/M&A
Top 1'-3'd Tier 3/17 7/19 3/9 5/6 0/18 6/6' 5/8b 16/16
Practices'
Corporate/M&A
Top 4th-5'h Tier 0/11' 2/10 2/11 13/16 N/A N/A 4/12 li/l1
Practices"
Capital Markets
Top 1"-31 Tier 0/15 2/13 1/6 d 1/8
e  3/9 0/12' 6/9s 6/12d 7/71 10/10
Practices'
Capital Markets
Top 41h-5,
h Tier 2/8 2/4 0/4 0/1 N/A N/A N/A 0/2d 1/7"h  5/5
Practices'
Data from 2006 Chambers Global Guide
These ratios reflect total corporate/m&a deals or international corporate/m&a deals, depending on
the specifics of the country rankings.
Larger Deals/Larger Resources
b Larger Deals/Medium Resources
I Two firms are non-US/UK
d Capital Markets Debt
I Capital Markets Equity
I Foreign Capital Markets
9 Capital Markets
h Five of six foreign firms are US based, the other is French based
This chart provides important insights into the increasing dominance of
Anglo-American law firms in capital markets. Within the China/Hong Kong
market, only three of the top twenty-eight firms ranked are local firms. Within
capital markets, none of the top fifteen practices in China are local firms and only
two of the eight firms in the next tier in the ranking are local. In Japan, none of
the top eighteen ranked firms for corporate/mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
work are domestic. Within foreign capital markets work, none of the twelve top
firms in foreign capital markets are local firms. Only six of nine local firms make
the list for top firms in domestic capital markets work.
Examining the European markets, each of the capital markets shows increased
penetration by non-local firms. This is most pronounced in Germany, where only
five local firms make the top twenty corporate/M&A practices, one often in capital
market debt practices, and one of nine among capital market equity practices. In
France, local firms hold nine of the top nineteen corporate/M&A practice honors
but only four of seventeen capital markets top practice honors. Italian local firms
tend to have the strongest showing. They continue to dominate corporate/M&A
work with eighteen of the top twenty-two corporate/M&A practices ranked. How-
ever, in capital markets work only a minority of Italian firms (three of nine) com-
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pete at the top end in terms of ranking for best practices for this work.
The situation in the United Kingdom suggests that in its home market, U.K.
firms are under attack by U.S.-based competitors, particularly for high-end deal work
that requires medium rather than large resources. Among medium resourced deals,
only nine of twenty top U.K. practices are London-based. U.S.-based firms take up
the remainder of the spots. However, when deals require larger resources for staffing,
U.K.-based firms hold all six top slots. Capital markets debt and equity work also sug-
gests a shift toward a greater use of primarily U.S.-based firms. Within the debt capi-
tal markets practice in the United Kingdom, a minority of top firms are British (six of
fourteen). Similarly, only eight of fourteen top equity capital markets practices are run
by U.K. firms. This contrasts with the United States, where all twenty-seven top cor-
porate/M&A practices and all fifteen capital markets practices are U.S.-based firms.
The provision of high-end legal services in Germany provides for a case study in
the increased leverage of U.S. and U.K. dominance in high-end legal services. Ever
since U.S. and U.K. law firm expansion into Germany began in earnest in the mid- to
late-1990s, this has transformed the German legal market. 6 International law firms
have become the new legal elite in Germany, as Chart I suggests. 7 Moreover, a number
of international firms have developed critical mass for large scale work. For example,
among U.S. firms, Shearman and Sterling has 105 attorneys listed as practicing in four
German offices, Cleary Gottlieb has 53 attorneys in two offices, Latham & Watkins has
118 attorneys in four offices, and White & Case has 206 attorneys in six offices. Among
U.K.-based firms, Clifford Chance has 360 attorneys in three offices, Freshfields has
561 attorneys in six offices, and Allen & Overy has 130 attorneys in two offices.'8
II. UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION
FROM THE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Within the field of business management, scholars have undertaken much re-
search to understand the effectiveness of firms in their internationalization. 19 How
16. Martin Henssler & Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers-A View From Germany, 19
DICK. J. INT'L L. 269, 272 (2001).
17. See Susanne Lace, Mergers, Mergers Everywhere: Constructing the Global Law Firm in Ger-
many, in 3 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW AND DEVIANCE: LEGAL PROFESSIONS: WORK, STRUCTURE AND
ORGANIZATION 51 (Jerry Van Hoy ed., 2001).
18. These figures are based on visits to firm websites on September 15, 2006.
19. For literature reviews, see Madan Annavarjula & Sam Beldona, Multinationality-Perfor-
mance Relationship: A Review and Reconceptualization, 8 INT'L J. ORG. ANALYSIS 48 (2000); Oded
Shenkar, One More Time: International Business in a Global Economy, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 161
(2004).
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this scholarship applies specifically to law firms remains under-developed. The ap-
plication of this work is critical to understanding the strategic management of law
firm expansion. Overall, the management literature explains that the international-
ization of a firm comes with costs and benefits.2" Firms perform well with either
high or low levels of internationalization. They tend to perform less well at medium
levels of internationalization.2' At the medium level, international firms must recon-
figure their internal systems to respond to the process of internationalization.2
Firm leadership plays a role in international expansion. When firm leader-
ship has had international exposure, this increases the extent of internationaliza-
tion of the firm.23 Firms that expand internationally earlier have greater knowledge
and experience greater international growth.24 However, there are limits to the
ability of firms to take in the knowledge they gain from their international expe-
rience. External knowledge must be assimilated by a firm for it to be utilized.25
The absorptive capacity of the firm to internalize knowledge limits the ability of
the firm to internationalize successfully. 6
Law firms have two strategic choices for international expansion-greenfield
expansion or expansion via merger or acquisition. Greenfield expansion occurs
through new entry and organic growth, and allows for revenue capture by a single
firm. It may lead to lower costs through reduced transaction costs.27 With green-
field expansion, law firms can boast to their corporate clients that scale effects re-
duce the information costs of selecting law firms across jurisdictions. Creating
critical mass allows for a firm to claim that it can coordinate legal work across
jurisdictions.28 The use of a single firm reduces the need to coordinate across firms
because the information costs of learning the deal are lower.
20. Winfried Ruigrok & Hardy Wagner, Internationalization and Performance: An Organiza-
tional Learning Perspective, 43 McMT. INT'L REV. 63, 68 (2003).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 70-71.
23. Nicholas Athanassiou & Douglas Nigh, The Impact of the Top Management Team's Interna-
tional Business Experience on the Firm's Internationalization: Social Networks at Work, 42 MGMT.
INT'L REV. 157, 173-74 (2002).
24. Erkko Autio, Harry J. Sapienza & James G. Almeida, Effects of Age at Entry, Knowledge In-
tensity, and Imitability on International Growth, 43 ACAD. McMT. J. 909,919 (2000).
25. Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal,Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning
and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. ScI. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 128, 128 (1990).
26. Kent Eriksson & Sylvie Chetty, The Effect of Experience and Absorptive Capacity on Foreign
Market Knowledge, 12 INT'L Bus. REV. 673, 674-75 (2003).
27. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
28. Debora L. Spar, Lawyers Abroad: The Internationalization of Legal Practice, CAL. MGMT.
REV., Spring 1997, at 8, 14.
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In the greenfield scenario, a law firm opens a foreign office and staffs it with
its own lawyers with J.D.s. The expatriates then select local lawyers to increase
the size of the local office.29 These local lawyers often have obtained their LL.M.s
in the United States or elsewhere. Greenfield investment allows a firm to better
control the cultural differences across offices than expansion through acquisition.
It allows a firm's foreign expansion to build upon existing firm best practices.
In the other scenario, a firm can expand through the acquisition of a preexist-
ing firm or a group of lawyers from a preexisting firm. Firms learn through their
experience. As a firm becomes more international, this increases the types of ex-
periences that a firm has.3' Firms experience learning "if through its processing of
information, the range of its potential behaviors is changed."32 Acquired firms
behave differently than greenfield firms because they have a preexisting culture.
An increasing body of literature demonstrates that acquisitions that do not create
a common culture may lead to acquisition failures."
Law firms may expand as a reaction to competitor expansion.34 Some firm
expansion may result from a herd mentality. That is, sociological imitation may
be at play in the decision to internationalize a law firm.3" Firm thinking in this
scenario is that other firms must have better information as to a certain foreign
market. If these firms are expanding into these markets, this is a signal that there
are increased opportunities in this market. 6 Other firms also may see the lack of
an office in a certain jurisdiction where the rival has an office as disadvantageous
29. See generally David J. Teece, Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J.
EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1982) (describing changes in the face of American business due to diver-
sification).
30. See Harry G. Barkema & Freek Vermeulen, International Expansion Through Start-up or
Acquisition:A Learning Perspective, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 12 (1998); Jean-Francois Hennart & Yong-
Ryeol Park, Greenfield vs. Acquisition: The Strategy of Japanese Investors in the United States, 39
McMT. Sci. 1054, 1055 (1993).
31. See Barkema & Vermeulen,supra note 30, at 7-8; Roland Calori, Gerry Johnson & Philippe
Sarnin, CEOs' Cognitive Maps and the Scope of the Organization, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 437, 452
(1994).
32. George P. Huber, Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures, 2
ORG. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 88, 89 (1991) (emphasis removed).
33. Barkema & Vermeulen,supra note 30, at 9 (citing a number of studies).
34. See Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 737, 741 (1994).
35. See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell,
& Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (discussing institutional theory and how individual choices are in-
fluenced by sociological context).
36. See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning From the Behavior of
Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151, 151-
53.
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in the competition to provide legal services to potential clients. This might create
the incentive for a firm to follow and to open its own office in order to compete
with its rivals."
However, many law firms lose money in their foreign operations. In keeping
these foreign offices open, law firm management at these firms believes that at some
point these offices will make a profit. 8 U.S.-based law firms face particular chal-
lenges. International firms often cannot compete with local firms on price and have
higher overhead than do local firms.39 Consequently, law firm outposts have to dif-
ferentiate themselves on the services that they provide. Firms will attempt to create
a seamless common culture across their offices. This suggests that a law firm will
try to sell its services internationally as part of the firm brand.4" This branding in-
cludes quality of services, in which the same quality holds across offices.
The nature and size of foreign offices may play an important role in their
potential profitability. Without critical mass, foreign offices may be less profitable.
Overall, toe hold expansion through greenfield or acquisition may make a foreign
office too small to compete in the local market. When a firm does not have enough
repeat business to send to a foreign office, this reduces the profitability of the for-
eign office. The smaller size of foreign offices also exposes such offices to increased
fluctuations in terms of revenue and productivity because work and expertise
tend to be concentrated across fewer practice groups.4 ' Other risks abound. For-
eign expansion may be risky where the client base of a firm may not be as easily
transferable across foreign jurisdictions. There may be limits as to the size of the
office or the needs of the existing client base.4 2 Referrals may dry up across local
firms if other players in the local market fear that referrals will not be recipro-
cated. 43
37. See David L. Deephouse, To Be Different, or To Be the Same? It's a Question (and Theory) of
Strategic Balance, 20 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 147, 147-48 (1999) (discussing the need for law firms to
strike a balance between conforming with and differentiating from other firms); Spar, supra note
28, at 13.
38. Spar, supra note 28, at 13.
39. Id. at 15.
40. See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Con-
tractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. Soc. 340 (1977).
41. See Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Service-Shifting Identities, 31
LAW & Poi.'v INT'L Bus. 1093, 1130-31 (2000).
42. Id. at 1131. Pay the foreign office too little, and the office may defect to a rival firm.
43. Abel, supra note 34, at 744-45.
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III. LAW FIRM EXPANSION MODELS
This article argues that there are at least six models of international expan-
sion of law firms. The first five involve traditional law firms. These models in-
clude: the charmed circle, the alliance/best friends, the magic circle, the
almost-charmed circle, and the not-so-charmed circle. The sixth model is the ex-
pansion of law practice by the Big Four accounting firms.
A. Charmed Circle
The first expansion model is that of the "charmed circle" of large New York-
based law firms. These firms represent large, sophisticated investment banks and
Fortune 500 clients in high-end corporate and litigation work, particularly in the
United States but increasingly in other markets. The charmed circle firms lack
large scale jurisdictional coverage because of a concern that per-partner profits
may get diluted with large scale international expansion. Charmed circle expan-
sion focuses almost exclusively in capital markets and in highly complex deal
work. The foreign offices of charmed circle firms remain small relative to other
foreign law firms or domestic firms.
B. Alliance/Best Friends
The second model is a more informal "alliance/best friends" model of a referral
network across firms. This is a conscious effort not to expand into certain markets
and instead create alliances with other firms in those jurisdictions. The reason for
alliance is that it reduces the costs to individual law firms. It does not require setting
up foreign offices where there will not be enough repeat work to justify such a rela-
tionship. There are coordination problems for such a model because of the infor-
mality of the arrangement and the increased monitoring cost to ensure high quality
work when such work gets referred outside of a particular firm. Similarly, there are
principal/agent problems to this model. These problems manifest themselves in en-
suring the same quality of work and attention across jurisdictions and across firms.
There is an increasing prevalence of more formal alliances.44 The largest for-
mal network of firms belongs to Lex Mundi. Lex Mundi boasts coverage that
44. See, e.g., Lex Mundi Home Page, http://www.lexmundi.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); Law
Firm Alliance Home Page, http://www.lawfirmalliance.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); The Law
Firm Network Home Page, http://www.the-law-firm-network.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2007);
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spans across 99 countries with over 17,000 attorneys in 160 member firms with
560 offices. 4 Firms within the network get a half hour of free time with questions
about doing business in their jurisdiction. Member firms meet on a regular basis
to facilitate client referrals.
These formal alliances have their limits. What may work as an effective strat-
egy at some point in organizational development may shift when clients demand
that a foreign office be opened by a particular firm. It may put strains on an alli-
ance relationship when members of an alliance compete for work with other
members of the alliance in the same jurisdiction. Similarly, an alliance strategy is
a function of available alliance partners given the strategies of competitors. If a
firm chooses an alliance strategy, this limits the potential formal alliances for
competitor firms. A lack of potential alliance partners may push competitor firms
to try to expand across markets and across practice groups to keep all of the reve-
nues of multi-jurisdictional work for themselves.
A less formal version of the alliance is the "best friends" model. Firms that
purposely do not want to expand into certain markets or types of representation
may pursue a best friends strategy of cross-referrals across jurisdictions to firms or
individual partners within these firms. With the possible exception of Baker &
McKenzie, all law firms lack global reach. Given this reality, law firms that pur-
sue other models of law firm expansion also pursue a best friends model to a cer-
tain extent. Over time, repeated interactions between best friends increase the
predictability of work relationship and work quality. However, the agency costs
typically remain higher among best friends than within a single firm.
C. Magic Circle
The third model is that of the top end London-based firms, the so-called
"magic circle" that have jurisdictional capacity around the world in both devel-
oped and developing world countries. There are limits to this worldwide foot-
print. With the exception of Clifford Chance, the magic circle model lacks a
significant U.S. capability. The inability of magic circle firms to cover the U.S.
legal market adequately suggests that one-stop shopping is more difficult to sus-
tain. By working with U.S.-based firms in large transatlantic transactions, magic
State Capital Global Law Firm Group Home Page, http://www.statecapitallaw.org (last visited
Feb. 3, 2007).
45. Lex Mundi, About Lex Mundi, http://www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/About LexMundi.
asp?SnID=2137785878 (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
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circle firms open themselves up to competition from these same U.S. firms in
subsequent deals if these U.S. firms have offices in magic circle markets.
The further large scale expansion of British firms through greenfield or acqui-
sition into the U.S. market seems unlikely given the Clifford Chance experience.
The Clifford Chance expansion into the U.S. market, via its merger with New
York-based firm Rogers & Wells, has been rather difficult. Some of the most profit-
able partners from Rogers & Wells have left the firm due to differences of manage-
ment style, compensation, and structure.4 6 These problems are not unique to Clifford
Chance. Rather, issues of cultural fit, management style, firm structure, and com-
pensation remain significant between U.S.- and U.K.-based firms.47
D. Almost-Charmed Circle
The fourth model is a modified charmed circle. These firms can be termed
"almost-charmed circle" in that their main competition includes members of the
charmed circle.48 Many of the firms in this category are not traditionally based in
New York. In such cases, the almost-charmed circle of firms lack the extensive ties
to New York-based investment bank clients and have regional roots in other major
U.S. cities. These firms tend to have become national through expansion into other
markets (e.g., Kirkland & Ellis, Latham & Watkins, Gibson Dunn) or "second tier"
New York firms (e.g., Shearman & Sterling, Milbank Tweed). Almost-charmed
firms have a significant presence in both New York City for transactional work and
Washington, D.C. for regulatory work. Almost-charmed firms charge rates similar
to those of charmed circle firms.
Almost-charmed firms seek to compete with the charmed circle for high-end
work. The lack of a large footprint of foreign offices (because of fears of profit dilu-
tion) from charmed circle firms provides almost-charmed firms an opportunity to
create a single firm network abroad. Almost-charmed firms can pitch one-stop
shopping to investment banks and Fortune 500 clients that might otherwise engage
a charmed circle firm. This creates strategic opportunities and choices for almost-
charmed firms. These firms may have a somewhat different strategy of interna-
tional expansion than charmed firms. That is, these firms may have more
46. See Anthony Lin, Clifford Chance Turns to Partner From London to Halt U.S. Slide, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 21, 2005, at 1.
47. John Flood, Lawyers As Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms In International Business
Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2007).
48. Am Law 100, AM. LAW. (2006).
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international offices or more heavily staffed international offices, the better to dis-
tinguish themselves vis-A-vis charmed circle firms to sell economies of scale and
scope abroad across a number of different markets. Because they lack the deep and
historic long-term relationships with investment bank clientele of charmed circle
firms that gives charmed circle firms access to many of the largest international
deals, almost-charmed firms open up more offices than charmed circle firms to ad-
dress a demand-side need to provide for seamless legal service across jurisdictions.49
E. Not-So-Charmed Circle
The fifth international strategy may be termed the "not-so-charmed circle"
expansion model. Firms outside of the charmed and almost-charmed circles in
the Am Law 100 focus more on midcap market work. These firms tend to have
many offices across the United States, lower per-partner profits, and prestige lev-
els lower than those of charmed and almost-charmed firms (e.g., Greenberg
Traurig, K&L Gates, Bryan Cave, Squire Sanders, Holland & Knight). Some of
these firms may pursue an international strategy that allows them to provide
greater scope vis-A-vis other similar not-so-charmed circle firms. Not-so-charmed
firms may want an international presence in as many cities as possible to overtake
dominant local firms for international work for midcap clients, much like their
U.S. expansion strategy.
F. Multidiscipline Practices (MDPs)
In a number of jurisdictions, accounting firms have made increasing inroads
into legal services. These firms have a larger platform in most countries around
the world and can provide one-stop shopping for a number of areas of service-
law, accounting, and consulting. However, the threat to firms in the U.S. legal
market may be theoretical so far.50 In the United States, because of regulatory bar-
riers, the accounting firms have not been able to move into the general practice of
law.5 Post-Enron discussion has chilled further expansion of these firms into tra-
49. Examples of historic ties include Sullivan & Cromwell's relationship with Goldman Sachs or
Davis Polk's relationship with J.P. Morgan.
50. See Garth & Silver, supra note 9, at 903-04. Rather than an economic threat, these firms may
threaten the legitimacy of lawyers. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation Between
the Big Five and Big Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contestsfor Professional Credibility, 29
LAW & Soc. INQ. 615, 616 (2004).
51. See Garth & Silver, supra note 9, at 910-18.
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ditional U.S. legal services. However, these remain formidable potential threats to
traditional U.S. law firms should the regulatory barriers be removed. 2
What constitutes legal services varies across countries. 3 This variation pro-
vides opportunities for accounting firms to operate law practices that might allow
them to leverage existing relationships on the accounting or consulting side.
MDPs present a particular problem for traditional law firms because accounting
firms are better capitalized than U.S. law firms and have a high leverage.54 This
allows MDPs to bill less than many law firms for similar services.
MDPs may be a particular threat to U.S. law firm expansion abroad. The
leading international law firms can hold their own against MDPs with highly
complex, high-stakes type work. 5 However, there is increasing competition for
commodity legal work. 6 Merely in terms of size, the accounting firms remain
significant players in legal services, particularly in the area of tax. 7 MDPs threaten
not-so-charmed circle firms the most, as these firms are the most likely to com-
pete for international commodity work and lack the scope of the network of the
big four. As the regulatory environment shifts to allow for greater penetration by
MDPs around the world, the threat of MDPs may grow over time.
IV. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE LL.M. DEGREE
Part of Silver's article focuses on the increasingly important LL.M. degree for
foreign lawyers. She notes that LL.M.s may serve as a bridge to an increasingly U.S.
(or U.K.) style of lawyering 8 Because of their U.S. legal education and potential
year of work with a U.S.-based firm upon graduation, lawyers with LL.M.s and
52. This threat has been realized in the United States in the realm of business counseling on tax
issues.
53. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a
Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & Soc'y REv. 713, 734 (1999); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary
Partnership, 13 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 217, 227 (2000); Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or En-
trepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United
States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 589, 625-28 (2002).
54. Heinz, Nelson & Laumann, supra note 4, at 356-59.
55. See Garth & Silver, supra note 9, at 928.
56. See Wendy M. Becker, Miriam F. Herman, Peter A. Samuelson & Allen P. Webb, Lawyers
Get Down to Business, McKINsEY Q., 2001(2), at 44, 48.
57. Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REv. 115,
171-79 (2001).
58. Silver, supra note 7, at 82-83.
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U.S.-based experience may sell themselves as premium lawyers. Silver's empirical
work into LL.M. degree recipients shows that it is difficult for LL.M. graduates to
find work in major U.S. law firms. 9 Indeed, nearly a quarter work for local firms in
their home countries that lack any foreign presence.6° For U.S.-based law firms in
their initial greenfield phase of expansion, foreign lawyers with LL.M. degrees
seem to return to their local firms after spending a year working in the United
States. This may serve to strengthen the alliance/best friends policy of the U.S. firm
with its foreign alliance partner.6
As U.S. firms have expanded into foreign jurisdictions and have moved be-
yond the initial greenfield phase of international offices staffed exclusively by J.D.
lawyers, the LL.M. dynamic changes. As foreign offices shift from primarily a
J.D. transplant model to an office structure primarily staffed with locally trained
lawyers who also hold an LL.M., an understanding of the importance of an
LL.M. degree, what it entails, and the opportunities that it provides (in terms of a
one year work permit in the United States) needs to be explored further. Gaps
remain in a larger understanding of how many foreign lawyers for U.S. or U.K.
firms have LL.M.s, and how many of these LL.M.s come from the U.S./U.K.
legal academe versus other, lower cost, academic LL.M. programs (Australia,
Canada or Continental Europe). A further research question is whether there is a
sense that the quality of LL.M. institutions explains placement in foreign offices
of U.S.- or U.K.-based law firms. Similarly, what types of firms do specific LL.M.
programs feed? Is there a difference in LL.M. placement in both local and inter-
national firms based on the LL.M. granting institution? Within the U.S. law
firm domestic structure, recruiting favors graduates from elite law schools.
Whether this holds for general LL.M.s and specialized LL.M. programs (e.g.,
banking, tax) makes for an interesting research question. An article by Garicano
and Hubbard that examines the role of lawyers with elite law school qualifica-
tions suggests that there is a strong relationship between the quality of the J.D.
law school institution (as a proxy for cognitive ability) and sorting mechanisms for
knowledge within a law firm and a weak relationship between cognitive ability
and experience. 62 This work has not been extended to LL.M. graduates.
Silver's observation on Frankfurt offices of international law firms shows that
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 74.
62. Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchical Sorting and Learning Costs: Theory and
Evidence from the Law, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 349, 350-51 (2005).
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a quarter of lawyers in these offices possess LL.M. degrees from U.S. institu-
tions.61 Over time, based on theory supplied by management literature, we should
expect to see that these LL.M.s will make up an even greater percentage of inter-
national law firm lawyers in these offices. A related research question is whether
the depth of LL.M.s in local firms makes them more attractive to international
law firms. Silver suggests that buying out local competition allows foreign law
firms to offer increased one-stop shopping.64 The more specific further research
question is, when U.S. firms hire locally-either through cherry picking or via
acquisition of an existing local firm at the partner level-are they more likely to
hire those with LL.M. credentials? Does this hold true for entry-level hires in
international offices?
V. TRANSITION IN FOREIGN EXPANSION IN U.S. LAW FIRM GLOBALIZATION
International law firm expansion has proceeded more slowly than domestic ex-
pansion. This may be due in part to the practice of law itself. Law has been a pre-
dominantly local enterprise. Countries have placed restrictions on the ability of
foreign nationals to provide legal services in their countries." In countries where
these barriers have been reduced or eliminated, this has changed the nature of legal
representation by U.S.-based firms. However, lawyers are no longer practicing
purely domestic law. Transactions and litigation increasingly involve multiple juris-
dictions.16
Silver provides an important explanation of the transition of foreign expan-
sion of U.S. law firms. In the pre-internet/communications revolution era, the
purpose of foreign offices was to sell U.S. law to foreign clients. 67 The communi-
cations revolution made a physical presence less important for international work
but more important for local work in other jurisdictions. The typical U.S. firm
now serves both local and foreign clients in its foreign offices. 68 Traditionally, the
U.S. firms would start with greenfield investment into new markets. 69 In the sec-
ond phase of expansion, U.S. firms acquired local capabilities, just as the manage-
ment literature would suggest. Silver provides a case study of the London legal
63. Silver, supra note 7, at 88.
64. See id. at 89.
65. Spar, supra note 28, at 11.
66. Silver, Regulatory Mismatch, supra note 9, at 489.
67. Silver, supra note 7, at 77.
68. Id. at 78.
69. Id. at 79-80.
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market, where U.S.-based solicitors and barristers now advise on local law issues.70
Due to increasingly lower regulatory barriers to the practice of law, an office in
that country might perform the kind of work no different than the type of work
done in a U.S. office such as Chicago, New York City, Washington, D.C., or Los
Angeles. Clients may be pushing for their incumbent law firms to expand when
there are issues of comfort and quality. This may suggest a demand-side theory of
law firm expansion. This demand-side theory may augment the supply-side tour-
nament explanation. In the demand-side model, law firms may be growing and
functioning based on the demands of its clients.7 That is, law firm clients have
begun to demand legal capabilities across jurisdictions.72 In this explanation, U.S.
law firms may be responding to client pressure by hiring local talent to protect
their client relationships around the world.73 This may be particularly important
in the most profitable and largest jurisdictions, such as in U.S. and EU markets,
and less in other foreign markets. This is a claim that intuitively seems true. How-
ever, there is a lack of empirical evidence of whether or not this holds.
Bierman and Hitt pick up on one theme that Silver touches upon: the trans-
formation of the practice of law in the internet age. The internet has reduced the
response time to redraft documents.7 4 Moreover, Bierman and Hitt provide the
critical insight that law has become more of a business, with a move away from
true partnerships to a more corporate business structure.7" These observations
suggest a number of potential research questions. Does the move to a more corpo-
rate structure affect turnover rates in firms? Law firm productivity? Law firm
happiness? Is this of particular concern to firms with a global presence in which
partners and associates must be available at all hours to address client concerns
from around the world? Initial analysis from Bill Henderson suggests that there
is a statistically significant negative relationship between per partner profit and
factors that affect associate happiness (except money). There is also a geographic
effect-associates in New York are statistically less happy than associates in other
large markets. Similarly, associates in Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco,
70. Id. at 78-79.
71. See Sherwin Rosen, The Marketfor Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215,242 (1992); Thomas, Schwab
& Hansen, supra note 57, at 137.
72. See Thomas, Schwab & Hansen,supra note 57, at 138-39.
73. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 7, at 80.
74. Bierman & Hitt, supra note 8, at 30.
75. Id. at 31-32. For a recent example of how this plays out among large U.S. law firms, see
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir.
2002).
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and Los Angeles are statistically less happy than Am Law associates in the re-
maining markets.76 What remains unexplored is whether associate and partner
happiness decreases as the firm expands internationally.
Just as the practice of law has become more corporate in its approach, there has
been a shift in the provision of legal services. That is, law has become more of a
commodity business." Clients have become less loyal to their preexisting law firms
and are more likely to seek counsel for specific transactions or litigations." This
competition among law firms allows clients to obtain legal services at lower prices,
as clients can play law firms against each other. The information technology revolu-
tion has only increased competition and pricing pressure for legal services. Bierman
and Hitt provide the example of GE's efforts at creating a priceline.com-type system
for commodity legal work. 79 This has potentially profound implications on other
Fortune 500 firms and the outsourcing of commodity legal work. We may be wit-
nessing the beginning of a larger trend. Other companies may follow the lead of GE
because as GE adopts cost-cutting measures for law firms, this may legitimate the
decision of other Fortune 500 companies to take a similar approach."
V1. NEXT STEPS IN A LAW FIRM GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH AGENDA
More interdisciplinary work needs to be undertaken to understand interna-
tional business."' Too often scholars across law, sociology, economic geography,
management studies, and economics do not communicate with each other in their
overlapping work in the study of law firms. Many scholars do not cite work out-
side of their field. This is a serious shortcoming to a better understanding of the
globalization of law firms. Below I provide suggestions for future avenues of re-
search into the globalization of law firms that allow for more interdisciplinary
approaches to law firm expansion.
76. Posting of Bill Henderson to Empirical Legal Studies Blog, http://www.elsblog.org/the-
empirical-legal-studi/2006/12/associatesatis.html (Dec. 16, 2006, 10:33 EST) (containing a
chart with data compiled by Henderson and David Zaring on attorney satisfaction).
77. Bierman & Hitt, supra note 8, at 32.
78. Kritzer, supra note 53, at 740; see also Baker & Parkin, supra note 5, at 1678 (discussing the
decline of relationship lawyering).
79. Bierman & Hitt, supra note 8, at 33.
80. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147 (1983); David S. Scharfstein &
Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 465 (1990).
81. Oded Shenkar, One More Time: International Business in a Global Economy, 35 1. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 161, 168 (2004).
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A. Understanding the Dynamics of Foreign Expansion
One topic that remains unexplored is whether there is a different compensa-
tion structure for local work than international work. Are the U.S. firms' foreign
offices paying more for their local lawyers than local firms? This would suggest
that there would be greater prestige to work for a foreign firm and greater finan-
cial rewards. International competition for the best lawyers may change the local
tournament model for lawyers. Lawyers with specialized skills who are younger
partners may be the most in demand for foreign expansion. Young partners may
be at the forefront of the battleground for talent because they know the contours
of the local market well but do not have the financial incentives based on seniority
to be as highly compensated as the more senior partners in local firms. These
young partners may excel in a pre-existing international legal platform in which
technical skills, rather than rainmaking skills, are at a premium.
The structure of international offices is in need of further study. What is the
difference in cost structure across international offices? Are per-partner profits
the same? Do these offices lose money or do they have enough deal flow, and if so,
can they charge premium rates? Is there a difference between the rates charged
on local matters between foreign and U.S.-based firms for local law in other coun-
tries? Does this contrast become exacerbated when the level of international work
is low and does it reach a potential tipping point in which too much local work
makes an international outpost unviable given the cost structure of an interna-
tional office? What role do international partners play in firm management? An
additional issue of the structure of international offices that has not been ad-
dressed is the decision by law firms to exit markets.
B. In-house Expansion
Due to increased globalization, issues of integration and sourcing for goods
and services for multinational firms has grown more complex than ever before. 2
These issues impact the in-house legal departments of multinational corporations
("MNCs") just as it does other functions of MNCs. The increased legalization of
business adds to the importance of the in-house counsel to the corporation. This
is due in part to the increased regulatory complexity under which companies op-
erate. Likewise, an increase in litigation has increased the exposure of legal is-
82. Elhanan Helpman, Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 12091, 2006), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/wl209l.pdf.
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sues.83 In-house counsels play an increasingly large number of roles in terms of
how their legal advice may be used.8
4
The economics literature provides a start for additional avenues of research into
the in-house practice of global law.8" Outsourcing involves tradeoffs between two
types of costs."s On the one hand, outsourcing of legal work outside of an MNC in-
volves issues of agency costs. 7 On the other hand, outsourcing implicates organiza-
tional costs. 8 Available datasets do not provide a way to test patterns of outsourcing
versus integration of legal services both domestically and abroad. Moreover, we lack
an understanding of when in-house counsel should expand in-house versus out-
source the work to international or local firms.
Adding to the complexity of empirical work in this area is how to define the
provision of legal services. Do such service providers only exist with the general
counsel's office of a corporation? One could make an argument that both lawyers
and non-lawyers in regulatory, government affairs, tax, and compliance groups in a
corporation perform "legal" services. The structure of who may get included within
the general counsel's office versus other corporate offices is critical to understanding
issues of outsourcing work to law firms or other professional service firms.
C. Reduced Transaction Costs and General Counsel Decision-making
Silver provides some important examples of U.S. law firms that sell services in
a number of different jurisdictions. How does selling firm services change across
jurisdictions? In critical front page Financial Times or Wall Street Journal transac-
tions, do savvy corporate clients partake in the cost savings of one-stop shopping
with lower coordination costs, or do they choose the best firm in each jurisdiction?
Sometimes it may be regulatory issues that drive a deal. In such cases, it may be
more likely that a general counsel will hire the best practitioner in each jurisdiction
83. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the
Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & Soc'y REv. 457, 459 (2000).
84. Id. at 462-73.
85. For a general analytical framework in this area, see Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Help-
man, Integration Versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium, 117 Q. J. ECON. 85 (2002).
86. See generally Pol Antris & Elhanan Helpman, Global Sourcing, 112 J. POL. ECON. 552 (2004)
(discussing the costs and benefits firms must weigh when deciding whether and how to out-
source).
87. Agency problems may reflect problems of managerial incentives. Gene M. Grossman & El-
hanan Helpman, Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production, 63 J. INT'L
ECON. 237, 240-46 (2004).
88. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937).
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rather than pursue cost savings based on one-stop shopping. When regulatory issues
are ancillary and/or the complexity of the deal and its structure does not drive the
deal regardless of deal size, this may encourage one-stop shopping for law firms
globally. Work that could test this hypothesis could provide valuable insights into a
global understanding of Gilson's lawyer as "transaction cost engineer" in his or her
ability to create value in a transaction because of expert skills. 9
D. Understanding Law Firm Expansion
Elite law firms sell their high-end repeat work experience to potential clients.
In this sense, high-end lawyers are "transaction cost engineers."90 For work criti-
cal to a company, this allows elite law firms to price at a high level, where price is
inelastic. How far can such firms grow in terms of total numbers of lawyers?
Growth of these firms requires labor-intensive, high-end work to justify the cost
of growth in their home markets. In the alternative, these firms would need to
increase their share of the pie in the other capital markets where price would be
equally inelastic. Increasingly, this is the case, as Chart I illustrates. Over time, it
is possible that U.S. firms will try to gain scale in the U.K. legal market to offer
high-end legal services to dominate large deals in the London market.9'
U.S.-based international firms sell their services based on lowering of transac-
tion costs. U.S. firms keep specialized knowledge of previous international deals
and litigations that provides them with an informational advantage over other firms
who may be only occasional players in multi-country complex transactions or litiga-
tions. This institutional knowledge allows firms to reap the rewards of their infor-
mation. Because of the primacy of New York to corporate law matters, this exposes
U.S.-based law firms to multiple iterations of big deals. These firms can draw on
these experiences to sell their services to multinational clients across jurisdictions.9
Similarly, London firms shape legalization in a number of jurisdictions.93
89. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239, 255 (1984).
90. Id.
91. In the investment banking world, the complexity of a deal has a positive correlation to the
size of the transaction. Henri Servaes & Marc Zenner, The Role ofinvestment Banks in Acquisitions,
9 REv. FIN. STUD. 787, 791 (1996). It remains to be tested empirically if this holds within law
firms.
92. U.S. lawyers may be more willing to think outside the box than other lawyers. Silver, supra
note 41, at 1095-97.
93. Flood, supra note 47, at 36.
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Such firms can offer a type of informal insurance to a potential client. If an
important and complex transaction or litigation does not go well, directors, the
CEO, and others in a corporation will be less likely to second guess the decision of
the general counsel to retain a charmed circle firm. Empirical work in the bank-
ing literature suggests that the investment banking equivalent of charmed circle
firms serve a similar insurance purpose. The involvement of a high-end invest-
ment bank in an IPO signals the quality of the offering.94 Initial research into law
firms in the mergers and acquisitions practice suggests that there may be a signal-
ing effect for the use of such law firms, in the sense that larger and more presti-
gious law firms work for the more prominent investment banks and corporate
clients.9
Because of the cost of these offices, a hypothesis would be that charmed and
almost-charmed firms lose work to others (e.g., local firms, not-so-charmed firms)
for more routine projects. Certainly, this hypothesis may offer a partial explana-
tion for the size of offices of global law firms. Only MNCs are willing and able to
pay such high fees. Such MNCs may only be willing to engage premier interna-
tional law firms for high-end corporate work. One area for further study is
whether non-U.S.- and European-based MNCs are willing to pay the high prices
that U.S.- and European-based MNCs pay for legal work and the particular
kinds of such work.
The explanatory value of demand- and supply-side models of law firm expan-
sion need to be tested based on data that measures the international expansion of law
firms. The first study to do this suggests that human capital and relational capital
have a positive effect on internationalization.9 6 However, this study overlooks both
country variables for expansion as well as human capital quality of practice groups
in a particular country setting. Specifically, what remains under-explored is the de-
cision to expand into particular markets and not to expand into other markets. Is
this expansion practice group driven and/or sector driven? For example, why has
there been greater expansion into some capital markets and not others? Why the
choice of specific non-capital market offices in certain countries but not others?
94. See Roni Michaely & Wayne H. Shaw, The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-
Selection and Signaling Theories, 7 REv. FIN. STUD. 279, 282 (1994).
95. C.N.V. Krishnan & Paul A. Laux, Legal Advisors: Popularity Versus Economic Perfor-
mance in Acquisitions 4-5 (Sept. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstractid =520343#PaperDownload.
96. Michael A. Hitt, Leonard Bierman, Klaus Uhlenbruck & Katsuhiko Shimizu, The Impor-
tance of Resources in the Internationalization of Professional Services Firms: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly, 49 ACAD. MCMT. J. 1137, 1148 (2006).
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E. Maximizing Firm Resources
If Bierman and Hitt are correct, there will be an increasing trend on the part
of corporate clients to lower the cost of legal services provided by law firms. If so,
why have law firms not anticipated this by shifting their commodity legal work
outside of the New York offices to lower-cost partners and associates in other ju-
risdictions, including other U.S. offices? As part of an empirical research agenda,
at least two hypotheses can be tested to answer this question. Hypothesis 1: Prin-
cipal/agent problem within a law firm; there may be principal/agent problems
where there is a concern about consistent quality of work across offices. Hypoth-
esis 2: Compensation Structure; it may be a function of the "eat what you kill"
pay model that shapes internal firm decision-making in many law firms. Com-
pensation may create different incentives for individual partners or practice
groups than firm profit maximization.
CONCLUSION
The explanation for law firm global expansion is complex. Much remains
under-explored. The works by Silver and Bierman and Hitt provide an important
first step to a richer understanding. As part of a larger law firm research agenda,
more cross country quantitative work should be undertaken to provide aggregate
level explanations. This work needs to be augmented by case studies of particular
firms and/or regions to fill out our understanding of the global expansion of law
firms. Further work can provide a much more detailed assessment of the country-
level expansion decisions for firms as part of a global strategy. To gain a greater
understanding of the forces that define law firm expansion, we require an under-
standing of the goals, outputs, structure, and limitations of law firm expansion
across countries. Such research will provide a better understanding of how law
firms, as professional services firms, conduct their increasingly global business.
This may have implications for the study of professional services firms more gen-
erally and for corporate strategy in international expansion.
